🔍 Read the full analysis: When Most People Farmed: A Look At AI And Work on ThorstenMeyerAI.com
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TL;DR
A November 3, 2026, essay by Thorsten Meyer uses agriculture’s long decline in employment share to examine what AI could mean for work. Its historical figures show that farming became far more productive while employing a smaller share of workers, but the essay’s suggestion that AI could automate up to 90% of a sector is a thesis, not a measured forecast.
Thorsten Meyer’s November 3, 2026, essay examines how agriculture moved from employing most workers in some countries to employing a small share, using that history to consider AI and the future of work. The account documents a long shift driven by tools, fertilizers and improved crop varieties; its prediction that automation might reach as much as 90% of a sector is Meyer’s thesis, not an established forecast.
Meyer cites economic historian Stanley Lebergott’s estimate, published by the U.S. Census Bureau, that 73.7% of the U.S. labor force worked in agriculture in 1800. The estimate covers a labor force of 1.9 million people aged 10 and older, including about 530,000 enslaved people. Because figures before 1840 are estimates rather than census counts, Meyer describes the share as roughly three in four. The essay notes that the U.S. agricultural workforce continued to grow in absolute numbers until about 1910, reaching an estimated 11.8 million, even as farming’s share of workers later fell.
The article presents agricultural change as a sequence rather than a single breakthrough. It points to John Deere’s steel plough in 1837, the industrial production of ammonia fertilizer after Fritz Haber’s 1908 patent, and the spread of short-straw wheat varieties in the 1960s. According to the figures Meyer cites from Indian government statistics, wheat production rose from 12.3 million tonnes in 1964–65 to 26.4 million tonnes in 1971–72. The essay attributes the change to new crop varieties working alongside fertilizer and irrigation, rather than to one technology alone.
Meyer cites an International Labour Organization estimate that 928 million people worked in agriculture worldwide in 2025, or about one in four workers. The share varies sharply: the essay gives estimates of 43% in India, about 1.5% in the United States and about 1% in Germany. It also reports that global cereal harvests grew 4.2-fold between 1961 and the period covered by its cited data, while the world population grew 2.7-fold. These figures support the essay’s point that fewer workers in farming have not meant less food, though they do not by themselves establish what AI will do to other occupations.
What Farming Can—and Cannot—Show About AI
The agricultural example matters because it separates employment share from output. A sector can produce more while employing a smaller proportion of the workforce, as tools, inputs and biological improvements raise output per worker. That history offers a useful comparison for debates about whether AI will replace tasks, change jobs or shift labor toward other parts of the economy.
But it is not a direct forecast. Farming’s transformation unfolded over generations and involved physical machinery, fertilizer, breeding and infrastructure. AI affects different tasks and may spread at a different pace. Meyer argues that automation could eventually cover up to 90% of a sector within a decade or a few decades, but labels this as his thesis. The historical record cited in the essay does not establish that percentage or predict how many workers AI might displace.
For readers, the practical implication is to distinguish productivity gains from job outcomes. Agricultural history shows that rising output can accompany a declining workforce share; it does not say whether workers find comparable new jobs, where those jobs emerge, or how benefits and disruption are distributed.
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How Agricultural Work Changed
Meyer’s second episode follows an earlier installment that divided the economy into field, factory and office. The farming episode starts with a broad historical pattern: the share of workers in agriculture was high in countries at earlier stages of industrial development, though the estimates come from different sources and are not directly comparable. Meyer cites estimates of about 85% in Japan in 1872, 83.5% in China in 1952 and 69.7% in India in 1951. These figures refer to different dates and categories, and some are historical reconstructions rather than census results.
In the United States, agriculture’s share declined over a long period, not in one sudden break. The essay cites German data showing farming’s share falling from 43% in 1882 to 25% in 1939 while the number of farm workers remained between 8 million and 10 million. It also describes changes in farm productivity: U.S. farm output in 2023 was nearly three times its 1948 level, according to the source material, with only a small rise in total inputs. The comparison gives context to the sector’s transformation, but does not isolate the effect of any single invention.
One further change came from synthetic nitrogen fertilizer. Plants cannot use nitrogen in the atmosphere directly, and farmers historically relied on sources such as manure and crop rotation to replenish soil. Meyer cites Haber’s 1908 ammonia-synthesis patent and the opening of the first ammonia factory in 1913 as milestones in the industrial supply of fertilizer. The episode’s larger point is that productivity rose through several linked developments, while farm labor’s share fell across decades.
“The share fell long before the headcount.”
— Thorsten Meyer, in the November 3, 2026, essay
The Limits of the AI Comparison
The essay does not identify a specific AI system, industry or study supporting its proposed up-to-90% automation scenario. It is not clear whether the figure refers to tasks, jobs, or a sector’s work overall, or how the time frame would vary across industries. The claim should therefore be read as Meyer’s hypothesis rather than a confirmed projection.
Historical numbers also have limits. Several early employment shares are estimates or reconstructions, use different definitions of agriculture, and cover different years. The article’s broad productivity comparisons do not establish that automation alone caused output gains or employment changes. Nor does the history show what happened to every displaced worker or whether the same pattern will hold for AI.
The source material does not specify a methodology for comparing AI capabilities with past agricultural technologies, or provide a forecast for job creation, wages and the distribution of gains. Those questions remain open. The agricultural case supplies historical context, not a timetable for AI-related labor change.
The Next Episode Turns to Machinery
Meyer says the series’ third episode will address mechanical reapers, threshers and tractors, extending the agricultural timeline from improved ploughs and crop inputs to machinery. The November 3 essay does not give a publication date for that installment.
For the AI argument, the next useful step is evidence that measures which tasks systems can perform, how widely employers adopt them, and what happens to jobs, output and pay over time. Until such evidence is specified, the agricultural comparison can inform the debate but cannot settle how quickly AI will change work.
Key Questions
What is the news development?
Thorsten Meyer published the second episode of his “Work After Work” series on November 3, 2026. It uses the history of agricultural labor to discuss possible effects of AI on work.
How many people worked in U.S. agriculture around 1800?
The essay cites Stanley Lebergott’s estimate that 73.7% of the U.S. labor force worked in agriculture in 1800. The figure is an estimate, not a census count, and includes about 530,000 enslaved people.
Does the essay establish that AI will automate 90% of a sector?
No. Meyer describes automation reaching up to 90% of a sector within a decade or a few decades as his thesis. The essay does not provide a forecast methodology or establish that this outcome will occur.
How many people still work in agriculture worldwide?
The essay cites an International Labour Organization estimate of 928 million agricultural workers in 2025, about one in four workers worldwide.
What does the agriculture comparison show about jobs?
It shows that farming’s share of workers can fall while agricultural output rises. It does not establish how AI will affect employment in other sectors or what jobs displaced workers may find.
Source: ThorstenMeyerAI.com
